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We study joint production games under a mixed output sharing rule in
which part of the output (the mixing parameter) is shared in proportion to
inputs and the rest according to exogenously determined shares. We show
that this game has a Nash equilibrium which is unique. When the mix-
ing parameter is set to the equilibrium elasticity of production (optimal
mixing) and all players have identical preferences and the same exogenous
shares, the corresponding equilibrium outcome is eﬃcient. Furthermore,
it is envy free when there are only two players and passes the unanimity
test when the elasticity of production is constant. When there are many
players and payoﬀsa r ee v a l u a t e dt oﬁrst order, all equilibrium outcomes
are eﬃcient and, by appropriate choice of the endogenous shares, all ef-
ﬁcient solutions which respect voluntary participation can be generated.
Furthermore, under equal shares the corresponding equilibrium is envy
free and pass the unanimity and stand-alone tests.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
Joint owners of a production technology with non-constant returns to scale and
with controlled access face the problem of selecting a procedure for distributing
the output. A natural procedure is proportional sharing in which each owner
receives a share of the output equal to their share of the aggregate input. This
sharing rule may be chosen on the basis of ethical principles or may simply be
an inevitable consequence of uncontrolled access to a jointly owned resource. In
the latter case, free entry leads to the familiar tragedy of the commons[11],[15].
More generally, this sharing rule results in over-production in equilibrium: a
Pareto improvement on an interior solution can be achieved by proportionally
reducing inputs[12], reﬂecting incomplete internalization of the externality. A
polar opposite case is the equal shares procedure in which the output is divided
equally amongst all the owners. Forcing equal consumption on all players makes
this case formally equivalent to provision of public goods [14], [3]). Voluntary
provision of such goods typically results in under-production, at least when
the technology exhibits non-increasing returns to scale[10]. The equal sharing
rule is readily generalized to exogenous sharing in which each owner receives
an exogenously determined proportion of the output independent of her input.
Once again, under-production is characteristic of equilibria under exogenous
sharing. Yet another class of procedures uses voting over levels of input and
output. For example, if inputs and outputs can be monitored and, say, are
divided equally amongst all players, only the aggregate input remains to be
determined. This can be achieved by asking each player to cast a vote for this
aggregate level and then selecting one of the votes, for example the median, as
the collective decision.
In an attempt to overcome the ineﬃciency and other undesirable features
of such sharing rules, Moulin and Shenker introduced the serial cost sharing
procedure[13], which may also be implemented via an output sharing variant.
Serial output sharing has several desirable properties. Under non-increasing
returns and convex, monotonic preferences, a Nash equilibrium of this sharing
rule exists and is unique. Furthermore, this equilibrium passes the unanimity
test (each player does at least as well as they could possibly do under an equal
split of input and output) and the stand-alone test (each player is no better
oﬀ than they would be if they had sole access to the technology). Typically
the equilibrium allocation will not be eﬃcient, though eﬃciency is ensured if all
players have identical preferences or if the technology has constant returns to
scale. Note though, that although no coalition can upset the equilibrium, all
members of the coalition may beneﬁt by pooling and redistributing inputs and
outputs. The proportional and exogenous shares procedures are proof against
such strategic manipulation since, in both cases, the total output received by
any coalition is a function of the aggregate input of that coalition and does not
otherwise depend on individual inputs.
The over-production which arises with proportional sharing is a consequence
of the failure to penalize a player for the negative externality she imposes on
the other players by increasing her input. Under-production with exogenous
sharing arises from the inadequate incentive provided to a player who only
receives a small proportion of the value of her additional input. This suggests
that an intermediate procedure may do a better job of balancing incentives
with internalizing the externality. More speciﬁcally, we study a mixture of
1the average and exogenous sharing rules in which the output is ﬁrst split into
two piles. Each owner receives a share of the ﬁrst pile in proportion to her
input and an exogenously determined share of the second pile1. We refer
to the proportion of total output in the ﬁrst pile as the mixing parameter.
Considerations of continuity suggest that there will be a value of the mixing
parameter for which the level of total output is eﬃcient. A simple case of this
procedure was analysed by Cauley, Cornes and Sandler[5]. In the sequel, we
investigate this claim as well as the existence, uniqueness and properties of Nash
equilibria of the game with mixed sharing and the choice of mixing parameter
and exogenous shares. The next paragraph summarizes our results.
When preferences are monotonic and binormal2, the technology exhibits
nonincreasing returns to scale and a technical condition is satisﬁed, the game
resulting from a mixed sharing rule has a Nash equilibrium which is unique.
When all players have identical preferences, the equilibrium allocation is eﬃ-
cient provided exogenous shares are equal and the mixing parameter is equal
to the equilibrium value of the elasticity of production. All subsequent results
assume this value of the mixing parameter. Eﬃciency holds even when players’
preferences diﬀer, provided either returns to scale are constant or the exogenous
shares are suitably chosen. With equal exogenous shares, a weakened form of
no-envy holds: every player prefers her own share of the equilibrium allocation
to the average input and output of her rivals. With the same assumption on
exogenous shares, the equilibrium passes the unanimity test, if the elasticity of
production is constant. It is possible for the stand-alone test to fail, though it
is always passed by players whose share of the input exceeds their share of the
output (net contributors).
These conclusions hold for any number of players, n.H o w e v e r , w h e n n is
large but preferences fall into a ﬁnite set of types and payoﬀsa r ee v a l u a t e dt o
ﬁrst order in 1/n, the results are much tighter. Equilibrium payoﬀsa r et h es a m e
for all players, up to a multiplicative constant. This means that all players agree
on their preferred value of the mixing parameter. Furthermore, the equilibrium
allocation with this mixing parameter is eﬃcient for any set of exogenous shares.
Conversely, these shares can be chosen to realize any eﬃcient allocation which
respects voluntary participation. When the exogenous shares are all equal, the
equilibrium allocation is also envy free and passes the unanimity test. The
stand-alone test is also passed; indeed a stronger variant of the test is satisﬁed
for net contributors.
To establish these results, we adopt a novel method of analysis which exploits
the fact that the choice of inputs under a mixed sharing rule is an example of an
‘aggregative’ game; any player’s payoﬀ is a function only of her individual input
and the sum of the inputs of all the players. For such games, the complications
of handling n-dimensional best response functions, which besets the analysis of
multi-player games, particularly when non-interior equilibria are admitted, can
be circumvented. To do this we work with a ‘share function’ for each player.
This function maps levels of aggregate input to the player’s (possibly zero)
preferred share of input that is consistent, in equilibrium, with the given level of
aggregate input. Equilibria are then characterized by the consistency condition
1Sen [16] brieﬂyd i s c u s s e sm i x e ds h a r i n gr u l e si nw h i c h ,a sh ep u t si t ,ap a r to fi n c o m ei s
distributed according to ‘needs’ and the rest according to ‘work’. He restricts attention to
games involving identical players.
2Both input and output are normal goods.
2that the sum of the share functions should equal unity in equilibrium. We show
that under standard assumptions, each player has a well-deﬁned share function
which also satisﬁes other useful properties; notably it is strictly decreasing where
positive, which rules out multiple equilibria. Share functions also underpin the
proofs of the other properties listed above, which are related to comparative
statics as well as providing a valuable tool for deriving the asymptotic type-
payoﬀs which lead to the results for large-games.
Section 2 formally describes the mixed sharing rule, introduces our running
assumptions and uses them to establish the existence and properties of share
functions. These properties are used to prove existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium. In Section 3, we discuss the properties of equilibrium alloca-
tions listed above for games which are not large. The two subsequent sections
discuss large games. In Section 4.2, we describe the setup used for large games:
a ﬁnite set of types each of which is represented by many players. The main
results of this section give asymptotic results, characterizing the equilibria and
oﬀering formulae for the asymptotic aggregate payoﬀsf o re a c ht y p e . T h ee ﬃ-
ciency and other normative properties outlined above are restated in asymptotic
form and proved in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Share functions, existence and uniqueness
Suppose that a set I of n players jointly use a technology which converts total
input L into total output X via the production function X = F (L).W e
consider an output-sharing rule that mixes proportional and exogenous sharing:
if player i supplies input `i, she receives the output xi,w h e r e










j∈I `j.H e r e λ is an exogenous mixing parameter satisfying 0 5
λ 5 1 and the θi’s are positive exogenous weights satisfying
P
j∈I θj =1 .A n
important special case is equal shares: θi =1 /n for all i, but the generalization
to arbitrary θi allows us, for example, to single out some players for an enhanced
share of the output. Alternatively, (1) can be viewed as the overall eﬀect of
an initial division according to the proportional sharing rule followed by the
imposition of a redistributive tax with a rate of 1 − λ.
Player i’s preferences are represented by a utility function ui(xi,` i).I f
L>0,p l a y e ri’s payoﬀ to strategy proﬁle (`1,...,` n) is ui(xi,` i) where xi is
determined by (1). Otherwise it is ui(0,0). We make the following assumptions:
A.1(Preferences) For all i,p l a y e ri’s utility function ui(xi,` i) is quasi-concave,
locally non-satiable, increasing in xi, decreasing in `i, continuous and con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable3.B o t h xi and `i are normal4.
3In her analysis of uniqueness and comparative statics of the game with proportional
sharing, Watts (1996) does not assume diﬀerentiability of utility functions. In our proof of
existence and uniqueness, we make this assumption for expository reasons, but the proofs go
through mutatis mutandis in the nondiﬀerentiable case if the MRS at (xi,l i) is interpreted as
the slope of a supporting line to player i’s upper preference set at (xi,l i).
4The assumption of convex preferences is redundant when inputs and outputs are normal.
We make it explicit for expositional clarity.
3A.2(Technology) The production function F(L) is increasing, strictly con-
cave, continuous and continuously diﬀerentiable for L>0,a n dF(0) = 0.
A.3(Boundedness) For all i, there exists a value of L>0 such that ui(F(L),L) 5
ui(0,0).
The ﬁrst two assumptions are standard. Our characterization of normality
in A.1 follows Watts [18]. Speciﬁcally, the marginal rate of substitution of
player i at (xi,` i) is non-decreasing in both xi and `i. Assumption A.3 excludes
the indiﬀerence curve through the origin lying entirely below the graph of the
production function when `i is measured along the horizontal axis and xi along
the vertical axis. This leaves two possibilities. The whole indiﬀerence curve
may lie on or above the graph of the production function. If a player with such
preferences had exclusive use of the technology, she would choose to supply no
input. A fortiori t h i si st h ec a s ei ft h e r ea r eo t h e rp l a y e r s . A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,
t h ec u r v e sc r o s sf o rs o m ep o s i t i v eL and a monopoly owner of the resource
would supply a positive but ﬁnite input. Suﬃcient conditions for A.3 are (a)
F0(L) → 0 as L →∞ , or (b) the indiﬀerence curve through the origin becomes
arbitrarily steep.
We write fi (xi,` i) for player i’s marginal rate of substitution at (xi,` i) and
ζi (σi,L) for the value of fi (xi,` i) when
xi = {λσi +( 1− λ)θi}F (L) (2)
and `i = σiL. Note that an increase in either σi or L cannot lead to a decrease
in either xi or `i. Hence, by Assumption A.1, the MRS cannot decrease.
Lemma 2.1 Assume A.1. Player i’s marginal rate of substitution: ζi (σi,L)
is a non-decreasing function of σi for ﬁxed L>0 and of L for ﬁxed σi.
Similarly, player i’s marginal rate of transformation of input into output can
also be expressed as a function of σi and L. Holding all other players’ input
levels ﬁxed and diﬀerentiating (2) with respect to `i, we obtain the following
expression for the MRT of player i as a function of σi and L:
∂xi
∂`i
= {λσi +( 1− λ)θi}F0 (L)+λ[1 − σi]
F (L)
L
≡ τi (σi,L).( 3 )
Concavity of F implies that, for ﬁxed σi,a ni n c r e a s ei nL reduces τi.F o r
ﬁxed L>0,i n c r e a s i n gσi places more weight on F0(L) and less on F(L)/L.
Since the average exceeds the marginal product, the MRT must fall for λ > 0.
Summarizing, we have:
Lemma 2.2 Assume A.2 and λ > 0.P l a y e r i’s marginal rate of transforma-
tion: τi (σi,L) is a strictly decreasing function of L for ﬁxed σi and of σi for
ﬁxed L>0.




b ew r i t t e ni nt e r m so fσi and L as:
ζi (σi,L) = τi (σi,L) (4)
ζi (σi,L)=τi (σi,L) if σi > 0.( 5 )
4It is straightforward to verify that, if X = F (L),t h e nxi satisfying (1) is an
increasing, strictly concave function of `i for any L−i ≥ 0.S i n c e ui is also
quasiconcave, conditions (4) and (5) are necessary and suﬃcient. It follows
from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 that these conditions cannot have multiple solutions.
Corollary 2.1 Assume A.1 and A.2. If λ > 0 and L>0, there is at most
one b σi satisfying (4) and (5).
The case λ =0may be accommodated by a slight strengthening of our
assumptions. In this case, τi is a constant function of σi for any L,b u tt h e
proposition would still hold provided ζi were strictly increasing in σi.T h i s
would follow from a slightly stricter interpretation of normality in which MRSs
were strictly increasing in xi and `i. We shall refer to this by describing player
i’s preferences as strictly normal. Observe, however, that strict normality would
rule out linear preferences.
For any L>0 for which conditions (4) and (5) have a solution in σi,w e
write si(L) for that solution. We refer to si as the share function of player
i. This function is the foundation of all our subsequent analysis and the next
proposition, proved in the Appendix, sets out the key properties of share func-
tions.
Proposition 2.2 Assume A.1, A.2 and A.3 and that preferences are strictly
normal if λ =0 . For all i t h e r ei sac o n t i n u o u ss h a r ef u n c t i o nsi which
satisﬁes exactly one of the following:
1. si(L)=0for all L>0;
2. there is Li > 0 such that si(Li)=1and si (L) is positive and strictly
decreasing for L>L i;f u r t h e r m o r e ,si (L) −→ 0 as L −→ ∞;
3. there are Li > 0 and Li >L i such that si(Li)=1and si (L) is positive
and strictly decreasing for Li <L<Li; furthermore, si (L)=0for
L ≥ Li.
The lower limit of the domain of the share function: Li is the monopoly
output of player i,m o d i ﬁed to allow for exogenous sharing. More speciﬁcally,
Li maximizes ui ([λ +( 1− λ)θi]F (L),L) with respect to L. If the maximizer
is 0, Case 1 applies.
In Case 3, the share function reaches the axis at the value Li which we call










It is convenient to set Li = ∞ to cover Case 2.








5and, for L ≥ Li,












Note that Li is ﬁnite in this example and satisﬁes
Li =
·





The main use of share functions is to determine and characterize equilibria
by imposing the consistency requirement that shares must sum to unity in equi-
librium. Let the aggregate share function S (L)=
Pn
j=1 sj (L). It is readily









for each i. If Case 1 of
Proposition 2.2 holds for all i, the null strategy proﬁle is the unique equilibrium.
Otherwise, Proposition 2.2 implies that S (L) ≥ 1 for some L and S (L) < 1





=1for a unique b L. This establishes the next theorem which
extends the result of Watts [18].
Theorem 2.4 (Existence and Uniqueness) Under the assumptions of Propo-
sition 2.2, there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
We can illustrate the use of share functions to obtain equilibria with an
example.
Example 2.5 Suppose n =3in Example 2.3 with θi =1 /3, (a1,a 2,a 3)=
(30,20,15) and λ =1 /2. The individual and aggregate share functions are
drawn in Figure 1. The unique Nash equilibrium corresponds to the point N





. Note that b L e x c e e d st h ed r o p o u tv a l u ef o rp l a y e r3 ,s ot h e
latter provides no input.
The next example shows that with an appropriate choice of mixing param-
eter, the equilibrium level of output is eﬃcient.
Example 2.6 Suppose ai =1for all n players in Example 2.3. The equilib-































Note that equilibrium payoﬀsa r em a x i m i z e dw i t hr e s p e c tt oλ at λ =1 /2,t h e
elasticity of production. The unique eﬃcient level of output can be found by













The ﬁnal example illustrates that eﬃciency of the equilibrium extends to
asymmetric equilibria provided that the game is large and payoﬀsa r ee v a l u a t e d
to ﬁrst order in 1/n.
Example 2.7 Suppose n is even, with ui = xi − li for odd i and ui =2 xi − li
for even i. Using the result in Example 2.3, the equilibrium satisﬁes si (L)=0






























if i is even.
Note that equilibrium payoﬀsa r em a x i m i z e dt oﬁrst order by both types at λ =
1/2 at which b L =1+o(1/n).T h e e ﬃcient level of output can again be found
by maximizing total surplus and gives L =1which is equal to b L to ﬁrst order.
In the following sections, we develop the results in these examples.
5We write an = O(bn) if there exists a contant k>0 such that |an| ≤ kbn for all n.W e
write an = o(bn) as n →∞ if lim
n→∞
an
bn =0 . See Apostol ( [1], p. 192) for a brief discussion
of ‘little oh’ and ‘big oh’ functions.
73 Mixed sharing with optimal mixing
3.1 Eﬃciency
In this section, we explore several properties of the equilibrium of joint pro-
duction games with mixed sharing rules commencing, in this subsection, with
eﬃciency. We start with the observation that the equilibrium is eﬃcient when
returns to scale are constant6 provided the mixing parameter is set to unity
(proportional sharing). To see this, note that conditions (4) and (5) imply that
the equilibrium MRS of each player is no less than the (constant) average prod-
uct, with equality if that player supplies positive input (and therefore receives
positive output). Given the convexity assumptions in A.1, these conditions are
suﬃcient for eﬃciency. This result reﬂects the fact that under constant returns
production imposes no externality. Under symmetry, however, eﬃciency of the
equilibrium can be ensured even for strictly decreasing returns but then the
mixing parameter must be less than one and exogenous shares must be equal.
The next result, proved in the Appendix, gives the details.
Proposition 3.1 Assume A.1 - A.3, identical preferences and equal shares. If
the mixing parameter is equal to the equilibrium elasticity of production, the
equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient.
Cauley, Cornes and Sandler [5] observe that, if λ =1 , equilibrium entails
overproduction whereas, if λ =0 , there will be underproduction. Assuming
continuity, they conclude that there must be of a value of λ for which the
equilibrium is eﬃcient. Proposition 3.1 reﬁnes this result by identifying the
required value of the mixing parameter, which we shall refer to as optimal.
If we drop the assumption of equal shares, identical preferences are not es-
sential for an equilibrium allocation to be eﬃcient. For example, when every
player’s utility function is quasilinear in input, the eﬃcient level of aggregate
input is unique. In this case any eﬃcient allocation can be achieved as the
equilibrium of a joint production game, provided the mixing parameter is opti-
mal and exogenous shares are suitably chosen. The next result, proved in the
Appendix, gives a formal statement.
Proposition 3.2 Assume A.1 - A.3 and that preferences are quasilinear in
income. Consider an eﬃcient allocation in which player i receives output xe
i
and aggregate input is Le. Then the exogenous shares can be chosen so that




i=1 b `i = Le.
3.2 Envy free equilibria
The acceptability of an allocation may be enhanced if it is envy free: no player
prefers a rival’s input/output combination to her own. Mixed sharing equilibria
need not be envy free. In the equilibrium of Example 2.5, player 3 supplies no
input and the utility of player 1 would rise from 351
3 to 362
3, were she to receive
the output of player 3 and not be required to supply any input. Note that
this is a well-behaved example: preferences are linear, elasticity of production
6Linear production functions do not satisfy A.2 but it is straightforward to verify that the
analysis of the previous section carries through provided preferences are strictly normal.
8is constant, weights are equal and the mixing parameter is optimal. However,
a weaker condition is satisﬁed: all players prefer their equilibrium input and
output to an equal division of the aggregate input and output were divided.
This result requires optimal mixing and equal weights. It is formally stated
below and proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.3 Let
³
b xi, b `i
´n
i=1
denote the equilibrium of a joint production
game which satisﬁes A.1 - A.3 and has equal exogenous weights. If b L denotes




,t h e n
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 for i =1 ,...,n. (8)
The inequality is strict if player i’s preferences are strictly normal and b `i 6= b L/n
for some i.
Note that the equal sharing of input can be thought of as a weighted com-
bination of the input of player i (with weight 1/n) and the average input of her
rivals (with weight (n − 1)/n) and similarly for output. It follows that a risk
averse player would reject the opportunity to swap her share of the allocation
with that of a randomly chosen rival. When there are only two players, these
observations amount to lack of envy.
Corollary 3.4 Assume A.1 - A.3, equal shares, optimal mixing and n =2 .
Then the equilibrium allocation is envy free.
3.3 Unanimity test
Player i’s unanimity lower bound is the highest payoﬀ she could receive under












An allocation in which every player’s payoﬀ is as least as great this bound is
said to pass the unanimity test. The equilibrium outcome of a sharing rule
which passes the test will (weakly) Pareto dominate any procedure which uses
some social decision rule to choose the aggregate input and divides input and
output equally.
The unanimity test is more stringent than no envy on average as expressed in
Proposition 3.3. Note, however, that when all players have identical preferences
these bounds agree. This follows from Proposition 3.1, for then the outcome is
eﬃcient and therefore each player’s payoﬀ achieves the unanimity bound. Even
when preferences diﬀer, under mixed sharing, with the optimal mixing and equal
shares, each player’s payoﬀ exceeds her unanimity lower bound, provided the
elasticity of production is constant.
Proposition 3.5 Assume A.1 and F proportional to Lα.T h e e q u i l i b r i u m o f
the mixed sharing game with λ = α and equal exogenous weights passes the
unanimity test.
9The proposition is proved in the Appendix. A natural extension in which




where (θ1,...,θn) is the vector of exogenous shares is also valid, provided mixing
is optimal and elasticity of production is constant.
3.4 Stand-alone test
The stand-alone test is a formalization of the ethical principle that players
should not beneﬁt from the negative externality they impose on their rivals. In
particular, the stand-alone test requires that no player do better in equilibrium
than if they had sole use of the technology. Formally, the equilibrium payoﬀ of
player i is bounded above by
uM
i =m a x
L≥0
ui (F (L),L).
Under mixed sharing rules, it is possible for some (but not all) players to
fail the stand-alone test for any positive exogenous shares and any value of the
mixing parameter less than unity. This is most easily seen in the case of an
unbounded production function and a player i with ﬁnite dropout point Li.I f
L ≥ Li,t h e nsi (L)=0and the player i has payoﬀ
ui ({(1 − λ)θi}F (L),0).
The unboundedness of F means that it is always possible to choose L suﬃciently
large that the payoﬀ of player i exceeds uM
i . By suitable choice of the preferences
of the other players, we can construct an equilibrium in which the stand-alone
test fails for player i.
If b L, the equilibrium aggregate output of player i satisﬁes Li ≤ b L<Li,t h e








































































≥ θi,w ec a l lp l a y e ri a net
contributor a n di ns u c hac a s et h et e r mi nb r a c e si sn og r e a t e rt h a nu n i t ys ot h e
right hand side is bounded above by uM
i . We conclude that net contributors
pass the stand-alone test.
In the next two sections, we show that when the game is large, equilibrium
allocations are eﬃcient, envy free and satisfy the unanimity and stand-alone
test, at least when payoﬀsa r ee v a l u a t e dt oﬁrst order in 1/n.
104P a y o ﬀs in large games
Results for large games are often sharper for smaller games. There are two
reasons for this. Firstly, strategic eﬀects are weakened in such games7 and, sec-
ondly, input and output are small, permitting the use of a linear approximation
to the utility function. We shall analyze output sharing games as the number
of players tends to inﬁnity using share functions as the vital analytical tool.
To avoid over-complicating the exposition, we reinforce A.1-A.3 by adding
some further mild assumptions. Only the second is essential to what follows.
A.1* Assumption A.1 holds and, for all i,p l a y e ri has strictly positive marginal
rate of substitution at the origin.
A.2* Assumption A.2 holds and F(L)/L −→ 0 as L −→ ∞.
A.3* Assumption A.3 holds and there is an L>0 for which F(L)/L exceeds
the marginal rate of substitution at the origin of at least one player.
The additional requirement in A.1* rules out the possibility that the slope
of the indiﬀerence curve through the origin falls to zero as it reaches it. This
assumption allows us to approximate preferences in the neighborhood of the
origin by linear preferences which continue to satisfy A.1.
Under assumption A.2*, individual shares of outputs become small as the
number of players becomes large. The assumption holds, in particular, when a
bounded resource is exploited but can also be valid when F is unbounded above.
Note that the marginal product, bounded above by the average product, also
vanishes asymptotically.
For simplicity of exposition, it is convenient to rule out null equilibria and the
additional assumption in A.3* does this. It holds, for example, under constant
elasticity of production.
4.1 Large symmetric games
We ﬁrst analyze games with equal shares, in which all players have the same
preferences. Theorem 2.4 shows that there is a unique equilibrium value
of aggregate input for each n, which we denote Ln and our ﬁrst aim is to








=1 /n,a n d





























b Ln , (10)
recalling f (x,`) denotes the MRS evaluated at (x,`). In the proof of the next
lemma, given in the Appendix, we show that b Ln −→ e L, say. Taking the limit








7Though not necessarily eliminated. See Cornes and Hartley [2002] for analysis of this
point for rent-seeking contests.
11Note that the right hand side of (11) is decreasing in e L and approaches zero for
large e L by A.2*. Hence, (11) has a unique solution for λ ∈ (λ,1],w h e r eλ is
deﬁned by:










If λ > 0 satisﬁes λ ≤ λ, we can show that b Ln −→ 0 and the limiting results
still holds, provided we deﬁne e L =0for all such λ.
Lemma 4.1 Assume A.1*-A.3* and that all players are identical. Then b Ln −→
e L as n −→ ∞,w h e r ee L is the unique solution of (11) for λ < λ ≤ 1 and e L =0
if 0 < λ ≤ λ.
It can also be shown that e L is the limit of dropout values of the n-player
share function, which we write L
n






























is ﬁnite and has a limit. Taking limits in (13) shows that L
n
−→ e L.T h e
following lemma summarizes these observations.
Lemma 4.2 Under the assumptions of Lemma 4.1, L
n
−→ e L as n −→ ∞.
Under A.2*, the average product falls to zero, so it is not surprising that
individual payoﬀs approach the reservation value, u(0,0), in the limit. However,







































as n −→ ∞, (14)
where we use (11) to obtain the ﬁnal line when λ ∈ (λ,1]. Under proportional
sharing (λ =1 ) the limit is zero: as the number of players increases, the ag-
gregate surplus is fully competed away. When the mixing parameter is less
than unity, the aggregate beneﬁt of that portion of the output that is shared
proportionally vanishes; what remains is the exogenously shared part and, if
e L>0, this has a positive limit even in a large game.
8The inequality is a consequence of A.3*. Note that λ =0is possible, if the average
product is unbounded e.g. constant elasticity of production.
124.2 Large asymmetric games
To analyze the case when players diﬀer, we envisage an inﬁnite sequence of
potential players each of whom falls into one of T distinct types. All players
o ft h es a m et y p eh a v ei d e n t i c a lp r e f e r e n c e sa n dw ew r i t eu(t) for the utility
function of players of type t(= 1,...,T) and extend the convention of enclosing
type subscripts in parentheses, where they could be confused with individual
players, to share functions, marginal rates of substitution etc. Let Gn denote
the game played by the ﬁrst n members of the sequence and let nt (n) denote
the number of players of type t in Gn. We require that the proportion of players
of each type has a positive limit.
A.4 For all t =1 ,...,T,a sn −→ ∞,w eh a v ent (n)/n −→ νt > 0.
To determine the exogenous weights in Gn, we choose a non-negative type-
weight µt for each type t to satisfy
PT
t=1 µt =1and set θi = µt/nt (n) if player
i is of type t in Gn. This is the most general set of weights which treats players
o ft h es a m et y p es y m m e t r i c a l l y .
We can use (12) to deﬁne λt for each type by substituting f(t) for fi.A s -
sumption A.3* guarantees that λt < 1 for at least one type. For such types,
if λ ∈ (λt,1] there will be a level of input which satisﬁes (11) and we use e Lt to
denote this value; it is the unique solution of







We also write e Lt =0for any type t for which λ ≤ λt.
All players of the same type t have the same share function which also
depends, through the exogenous weights, on n.W e u s e sn
(t) to denote this share
function and note that, by the same arguments as for the symmetric case, it
reaches the axis at a ﬁnite value: L
n
(t), the dropout value of type t.I f λ < λt,
the share function is identically zero for positive L for all large enough n.F o r
such a share function, we set L
n
t =0 . Lemma 4.2 implies that L
n
(t) −→ e Lt
as n −→ ∞. This observation allows us to establish that, if e Lt0 < e Lt,p l a y e r s
of type t0 cease to participate once the number of players of type t becomes
suﬃciently large.
Lemma 4.3 Assume A.1*-A.3*, A.4 and λ > 0.I f e Lt0 < e Lt, players of type
t0 supply no input in the equilibrium of Gn for all large enough n.
The proof is based on a simple idea. Suppose two types in some game were
to have distinct dropout values, independent of the number of players of each
type. Once there are enough players of the type with larger dropout value,
the aggregate share function at the lower dropout value exceeds one, so players
with the latter dropout value supply no input in equilibrium. The proof of
Lemma 4.3 is a little more delicate because of the need to take account of the
dependence of dropout values on the number of players and details are given in
the Appendix.
Let T denote the set of types which maximize e Lt and T its complement in
{1,...,T}. We can assume, without loss of generality, that T ∈ T which means
13that e Lt = e LT for t ∈ T and e Lt < e LT for t ∈ T . By equation (15), this is equiva-
lent to assuming that f(t) (0,0) = f(T) (0,0) for t ∈ T and f(t) (0,0) >f (T) (0,0)
for t ∈ T . Lemma 4.3 shows that only players of types in T participate in
the limit in Gn and the next lemma shows that aggregate input of these types
approaches e LT.
Lemma 4.4 Assume A.1*-A.3*, A.4 and λ ∈ (0,1].I f b Ln denotes aggregate
equilibrium input in Gn,t h e nb Ln −→ e LT as n −→ ∞.
This result, which is proved in the Appendix, generalizes Lemma 4.1. We
would like to exploit it to generalize the expression (14) for the limiting aggregate
excess payoﬀs of each type. To do this, we need the limiting value of the
aggregate input supplied by each type in T . Unfortunately, the existence of
this limit is not an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.4. We need the following
result, which is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.5 Assume A.1*-A.3*, A.4 and λ ∈ (0,1].F o r e a c h t ∈ T ,t h e r e
is a e σt ∈ [0,1] satisfying
P





−→ e σt as
n −→ ∞.
This lemma asserts the existence of limiting aggregate shares, which allows
us to deduce the limiting equilibrium aggregate allocation. The aggregate
equilibrium input and output of type t in Gn,w h i c hw ew r i t eb Ln
t and b Xn
t ,







b Ln −→ e σte LT. (16)
If t ∈ T , Proposition 4.3 implies b Ln
t =0for all large enough n so (16) continues
to hold provided we deﬁne
e σt =0for all t ∈ T .

















and, letting n −→ ∞ yields:





S i n c ep l a y e r so ft h es a m et y p eh a v et h es a m es h a r ef u n c t i o n ,a l ls u c hp l a y e r s
enjoy the same input and output in equilibrium; we call such allocations type-
symmetric. We will use {Xt,L t}
T
t=1 to denote a type-allocation,w h e r eLt and
Xt are the aggregate input supplied and output received by players of type t.
For an individual i of type t in Gn,w eh a v e`i = Lt/nt and xi = Xt/nt.F o r
any such allocation, we write ψt (Xt,L t) for the limiting aggregate excess payoﬀ
of players of type t:

















Xt − Ltf(t) (0,0)
¤
. (17)
14This notation is used to write limiting payoﬀsi nt h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n ,
which also summarizes the previous discussion. The ﬁnal assertion is proved in
the Appendix.
Proposition 4.1 Assume A.1*-A.3*, A.4 and λ ∈ (0,1].T h e l i m i t i n g e q u i -
librium type-allocation is given by
³



























and e LT is the solution of (15) for players of type T.
The proposition shows that the limiting equilibrium type-allocation and ex-
cess payoﬀs are approximations, to ﬁrst order in 1/n, of the equilibrium allo-
cation and payoﬀsi nGn for large n. The proposition also has an interesting
consequence for the choice of mixing parameter in large games for, to ﬁrst order
in 1/n, every player will agree on their most preferred value of λ,n a m e l yt h e
value that maximizes φ. Note that this is true even though individual prefer-
ences and/or exogenous shares may diﬀer. The universally preferred value can





























is the unique stationary point of φ.F u r t h e r -




, the stationary point
is a maximum. The unanimously preferred value of the mixing parameter in a
large game is the limiting equilibrium value of the elasticity of production. As





Under optimal mixing 15, with t = T, becomes





The following lemma, which will prove useful in the sequel, records an immediate
consequence of this equality.
Lemma 4.6 Assume A.1*-A.3*, A.4 and optimal mixing. Then ψt (F (L),L)
is maximised at L = e LT.
In the next section, we will establish that optimal mixing leads to an eﬃcient,
envy-free limiting equilibrium, which also passes the unanimity and stand-alone
tests.
155 Asymptotic equilibria under optimal mixing
5.1 Eﬃciency
We will say that a type-symmetric type allocation {Xt,L t}
T
t=1 is asymptot-







t) ≥ ψt (Xt,L t) for t =1 ,...,T with at least one strict inequality.
Convexity of preferences implies that, if a type-symmetric allocation is domi-
nated by some other allocation, it is dominated by a type-symmetric allocation
namely that obtained by giving all players the average input and output for
their type. This means we only need consider re-allocations between types. In
particular, we can conclude from the limiting results in the preceding section
that an allocation obtained from an asymptotically eﬃcient type allocation by
sharing input and outputs equally amongst players of the same type is eﬃcient
to ﬁrst order in 1/n. The next theorem, proved in the Appendix, establishes
that optimal mixing implies asymptotic eﬃciency.
Theorem 5.1 Assume A.1*-A3*, A.4 and optimal mixing. The limiting equi-
librium type-allocation:
n




The limiting aggregate output e LT is independent of the exogenous weights
{µt}
T
t=1. However Proposition 4.1 shows that the choice of weights does aﬀect
the payoﬀs of particular types. We can use the freedom to choose these weights
to eﬀect redistribution. Indeed, we can prove a converse of the preceding result:
any type-symmetric eﬃcient allocation which respects voluntary participation
can be realized asymptotically as an equilibrium with a mixed sharing rule with
an appropriate choice of weights. Voluntary participation requires ψt (Xt,L t) ≥
0 for t =1 ,...,T. By “realization”, we mean that any such allocation is
payoﬀ-equivalent to an equilibrium of Gn. This result is formalized in the next
theorem and proved in the Appendix.





be an asymptotically eﬃcient type-symmetric allocation satisfying voluntary par-
ticipation. Then there is a set of type-weights for which the limiting equilibrium
type-allocation:
n










t) for t =1 ,...,T. (19)
Note that players of types in T supply no input so the output they receive in
Gn is exactly that in the eﬃcient allocation. It follows that, if T is a singleton,
the equilibrium of Gn can achieve any eﬃcient allocation respecting voluntary
participation (and not just one which is payoﬀ equivalent to that allocation).
5.2 Envy freeness
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 show that, under optimal mixing, all and every eﬃcient
allocation dominating the null allocation is a Nash equilibrium for suitable choice
of exogenous shares. In this subsection, we show that, under equal shares the
equilibrium is also envy free to ﬁrst order in 1/n. This recalls the results of,
16for example, Varian [17] and Champsaur and Laroque [6] on the equivalence
of eﬃcient, envy free allocations and competitive equilibria with equal initial
endowments. Consider a type-allocation {Xt,L t}
T
t=1 in which players of the
same type receive equal allocations. If a player of type t were to receive the





























for all t,t0 =1 ,...,T. (20)
Under a generalisation of equal exogenous weights, the equilibrium of a large
game is envy free. The natural asymptotic version of equal weights is propor-
tional type-weights: µt = νt for all t. The next result, proved in the Appendix,
formalizes this result.
Proposition 5.3 Assume A.1*-A3*, A.4, optimal mixing and proportional type
weights. Then the limiting equilibrium type-allocation is asymptotically envy
free.
We can apply this proposition to Gn for large n and equal weights. All
players of the same type will receive the same output and supply the same in-
put in equilibrium and so no player will envy a rival of the same type. Envy is
only possible between players of diﬀerent types and, by the preceding proposi-
tion, this is ruled out under equal weight to ﬁrst order in 1/n: the equilibrium
allocation is envy free to ﬁrst order.
5.3 Asymptotic unanimity test
The equilibrium of Gn under equal weights and optimal mixing has other desir-
able properties. In Subsection 3.3, we established that the equilibrium satisﬁes
the unanimity test for production functions with constant elasticity. For large
games, an asymptotic version of the test holds without additional restrictions
on the production function. This involves a bound computed by supposing that
all n players in Gn have access to a copy of the technology, all supply the same
level of input and the output is split equally. If aggregate input is L, limiting














= νtψt (F (L),L).
We deﬁne the asymptotic unanimity lower bound for type t to be the maximal
limiting aggregate excess payoﬀ o fp l a y e r so ft h i st y p e :
νt max
L
ψt (F (L),L). (21)
17The next proposition states that, under equal shares and optimal mixing, the
equilibrium satisﬁes the asymptotic unanimity test. The proof is in the Ap-
pendix.
Proposition 5.4 Assume A.1*-A.3*, A.4, optimal mixing and proportional
type weights. Then the asymptotic equilibrium payoﬀ is not less than the asymp-
totic unanimity lower bound.
The proposition allows us to conclude that, in the equilibrium of Gn with
equal shares and large n, every player is at least as well oﬀ as when players
cooperatively run a copy of the technology and split the output equally (to ﬁrst
order in 1/n).
5.4 Stand-alone tests
The stand-alone test requires that no player do better than when they have sole
access to the technology. For large n the equilibrium of Gn satisﬁes this test
trivially: excess payoﬀs in equilibrium approach zero as n −→ ∞ whereas a
player can always achieve a postive excess payoﬀ with sole access to the tech-
nology. A more demanding version of the test applies it to types, assuming all
and only players of type t have access to the technology and that the output and
input are split equally amongst the players of that type. We therefore deﬁne









F (L) − Lf(t) (0,0)
¤
.
If t ∈ T ,w eh a v ef(t) (0,0) = f(T) (0,0) and so the right hand side, using Lemma















By Proposition 4.1, the right hand side is the aggregate equilibrium payoﬀ to
type t. We conclude that types in T do not beneﬁt from the negative externality
they impose; the asymptotic stand-alone test is satisﬁed for these types. This
does not necessarily extend to the remaining types since f(t) (0,0) >f (T) (0,0)
for t ∈ T . The beneﬁtt ot y p et from leaving production to more eﬃcient
types may outweigh the fact that players of type t do not receive all the output.
Of course, if their type weight is suﬃciently small, the stand-alone test will be
satisﬁed.





is the unique value of the mixing parameter for which the equi-
librium is Pareto eﬃcient. To see this, we simply note that, to ﬁrst order in 1/n,
all players have payoﬀs proportional to F (L) − Lf(T) (0,0) which is uniquely
maximized at the solution of F0 (L)=f(T) (0,0). T h i si ss o l v e da tL = e L(T)





6C o n c l u s i o n
When the mixing parameter is set optimally and the game is “small”, equilib-
rium under mixed sharing and equal shares has a number of desirable properties.
18The equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient when returns to scale are constant or pref-
erences are identical, envy free for two players, passes the unanimity test under
constant elasticity of production and passes the stand-alone test for net con-
tributors. When the game is “large”, there is ﬁnite set of distinct types and
payoﬀs for types are taken to be asymptotic aggregate excess payoﬀs, the sets
of eﬃcient allocations respecting voluntary participation and of equilibrium al-
locations with optimal mixing are identical. Indeed, by varying the exogenous
weights, the whole set can be mapped out. If, in addition, exogenous weights
are equal, asymptotic equilibria are envy free and pass the unanimity test. The
stand-alone test is also satisﬁed, indeed a stronger type-speciﬁcv e r s i o nh o l d s
for types which are net contributors.
Furthermore, for large games, equilibrium payoﬀs for each type are propor-
tional to the same function of the mixing parameter. This means that players
of all types prefer the (optimal) value of this parameter and suggests the use of
a more elaborate procedure in which the choice is endogenous. For example,
consider a two stage mechanism in which, in the ﬁrst stage, players vote for their
preferred value of the mixing parameter and, in the second stage, play a joint
production game with mixing parameter set to the median vote. In section 4,
we showed that second stage payoﬀs are single-peaked in the mixing parameter
with peak equal to the optimal value. Hence, voting for the optimal value is a
dominant strategy for every player in the ﬁrst stage [4].
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7 Appendix: proofs
7.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proposition 2.2 is a consequence of the following pair of lemmas, the ﬁrst of
which implies that, if the domain of si is non-empty, it must be a semi-inﬁnite
interval and that si is non-increasing, and indeed strictly decreasing where pos-
itive.
Lemma 7.1 Assume A.1 and A.2 and that preferences are strictly normal if
λ =0 .I f L1 >L 0 > 0 and si(L0) exists, then si(L1) exists and si(L1) 5
si(L0). The latter inequality is strict if si(L0) > 0.
Proof. From Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 and the ﬁrst-order conditions, we have
ζi(si(L0),L 1) = ζi(si(L0),L 0) = τi(si(L0),L 0) > τi(si(L0),L 1).
Hence, either (a) ζi(σi,L 1) > τi(σi,L 1) for all σi ∈ (0,1),o r( b )ζi(b σi,L 1)=
τi(b σi,L 1) for some b σi. In case (a), si(L1)=05 si(L0) and the inequality
is strict if si(L0) > 0.I n c a s e ( b ) , s i n c e ζi is non-decreasing in σi and τi is
strictly decreasing in σi,w eh a v esi(L1) <s i(L0). Note that (b) can only occur
if si(L0) > 0. Again, if λ =0 , Lemma 7.1 remains valid when the normality
requirement in A.1 is strengthened to strict normality.
Our second lemma rules out pathological behavior such as an empty domain,
downward jumps or a strictly positive limit as L →∞ .
20Lemma 7.2 Assume A.1, A.2 and A.3 and that preferences are strictly normal
if λ =0 .E i t h e r si(L)=0for all L>0,o r ,f o ra n yσi ∈ (0,1], there is a value
of L satisfying si(L)=σi.
Proof of Lemma 7.2. Suppose θi > 0.W e w r i t e F0(0) for the limit
of F0(L) as L −→ 0.W h e n F0(L) is unbounded, we take F0(0) = ∞ and
make the usual arithmetic and comparative assumptions. From A.2, for any
L>0,t h e r ei sa nL0 satisfying 0 <L 0 <Land F0 ¡
L0¢
= F (L)/L. Hence,
F (L)/L −→ F0(0) as L −→ 0 and, taking limits in (3) shows that
τi (σi,L) −→ {λ +( 1− λ)θi}F0(0) as L −→ 0.
We can focus on the case where
{λ +( 1− λ)θi}F0(0) >f i (0,0) = ζi (σi,0), (22)
for, if (22) did not hold, A.1 and A.2 would imply that the indiﬀerence curve
through the origin would lie below the graph of F. In this case, player i would
never participate actively: si (L)=0for all L>0.
We will prove that (5) holds for some L>0 by demonstrating the existence
of L∗ such that
τi (σi,L ∗) ≤ ζi (σi,L ∗) (23)








For any L>0, A.2 implies φ
∗
i (L) <F(L); the graph of φ
∗
i lies below that of
F. By (22), F0(0) >f i (0,0) and A.3 implies that the graph of F crosses the
indiﬀerence curve through the origin from above. Since φ
∗0
i (0) = F0 (0),w e
may deduce that the graph of φ
∗
i also crosses this indiﬀerence curve through the
origin from above. If L = L0 at the crossing point, the gradient of a line from
the origin to the crossing point does not exceed the slope of this indiﬀerence




L0 ≤ fi (φ
∗
i (L0),L 0).
Write L∗ = L0/σ∗,s ot h a t
F (L∗)
L∗ ≤ fi (σ∗F (L∗),σ∗L∗) ≤ ζi (σi,L ∗).
The second inequality uses A.1, the expression (2) and the inequalities σ∗ ≤
λσi +( 1− λ)θi and σ∗ ≤ σi.N o t i n g t h a t F (L∗)/L∗ is an upper bound to
τi (σi,L ∗) establishes (23) and completes the proof for positive θi.
If θi =0and λ > 0, the same proof is valid with σ∗ = λσi.I f λ = θi =
0,p l a y e ri receives no output and therefore supplies no input in equilibrium:
si (L)=0for all L>0.
These two lemmas ensure that si is (a) continuous9, (b) strictly decreasing
where positive, (c) approaches or equals 0 as L −→ ∞ which completes the
proof of Proposition 2.2.
9A discontinuous, non-increasing function would have to exhibit downward jumps, ruled
out by Lemma 7.2.
217.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
If the share function is zero for all L>0, the only equilibrium is null and the
corresponding allocation is vacuously eﬃcient. Otherwise, Theorem 2.4 allows
us to conclude that there is a unique value of the aggregate equilibrium input,




=1 /n for every player i.T h e i n t e r i o r ﬁrst order





























where b X denotes the aggregate output.
Any allocation which maximizes the sum of utilities:
Pn
i=1 u(xi,` i) subject
to the feasibility conditions:
Pn
i=1 xi = F (
Pn
i=1 `i) and (xi,` i) ≥ (0,0) for















, we may deduce that xf = b X/n and `f = b L/n is eﬃcient
and this completes the proof.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
If ui (xi,` i)=vi (xi) − `i for i =1 ,...,n, the feasible allocation {(xi,` i)}
n
i=1
is eﬃcient if and only if it maximizes the aggregate surplus. Necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for this are
v0
i (xi)F0 (L) ≤ 1 for i =1 ,...,n, (25)
with equality if xi > 0. Note that any set of individual inputs summing to L will
be eﬃcient, provided outputs satisfy (25). With such preferences, conditions














i (xi)F0 (L) ≤ 1 for i =1 ,...,n, (26)
with equality if `i > 0.
If Le and xe
i denote the eﬃcient values of L and xi and the mixing parameter
satisﬁes λ = η (Le), then (25) and (26) are equivalent provided individual inputs
satisfy `i = xe
iLe/F (Le) for i =1 ,...,n. From (1), this holds for θi =
xe
i/F (Le).
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3














22for 0 ≤ σi ≤ 1 and consider a player i for whom b σi ≤ 1/n,w h e r eb σi = b `i/b L.
If e σi maximizes us
i,w es h a l ls h o wt h a te σi ≤ b σi.Q u a s i c o n c a v i t y o f ui and
therefore of us
i then allows us to conclude that us
i (b σi) ≥ us
i (1/n),w h i c hi s
simply a rewriting of (8). (Alternatively, if b σi > 1/n a proof along identical
lines gives e σi ≥ b σi and so us
i (b σi) ≥ us
i (1/n), again. We omit details of this
case.)
Necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst order conditions for maximizing us
i when 0 ≤









e σi, b L
´
, (27)
with equality if e σi > 0.

















b σi, b L
´
.
We have assumed b σi ≤ 1/n, so the term in braces exceeds unity and e σi ≤ b σi




is non-decreasing in σ (Lemma 2.1). If
player i’s preferences are strictly normal, ζi is strictly increasing in σ which
justiﬁes the ﬁnal claim in the proposition.


















e σi, b L
´
,
where the last inequality is justiﬁed by Lemma 2.1. It follows that (27) can never
be satisﬁed with equality and therefore e σi =0≤ b σi as required. To justify the
ﬁnal claim in the proposition in this case, note that we have established that
us
i (0) ≥ us
i (σ) for all σ ∈ [0,1]. Were this inequality to hold with equality
for some σ∗ > 0,q u a s i c o n c a v i t yo fus
i would imply that us
i (σ)=us
i (0) for
0 ≤ σ ≤ σ∗ which would contradict strictly normal preferences. We may
conclude us
i (b σi)=us
i (0) >u s
i (1/n) as required.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Note that for the production function in the proposition both A.2 and A.3 are
satisﬁed. Under the assumptions of the proposition, the payoﬀ to player i in











The proposition is proved by showing that ue
i is minimized at e Li,t h ev a l u eo fL
that achieves the maximum in the deﬁnition of the unanimity bound (9). The
















αLα−1 + α[1 − si (L)]Lα−1 = ζi (si (L),L). (29)





Now si is diﬀerentiable, by the implicit function theorem, and therefore so
is ue







[1 − si (L) − s0
i (L)L]
©
ζi (si (L),L) − αLα−1ª
= α(1 − α)
∂ui
∂x








For this range of L we have si (L) < 1 and s0
i (L) ≤ 0 by Proposition 2.2 and
it follows that ue
i is minimized where si (L)=1 /n i.e. at L = e Li.S i n c e si is
decreasing, we may deduce that the slope of ue
i has the sign of L− e Li.W e m a y
conclude that ue
i is minimized at e Li,a sc l a i m e d .
7.6 Completion of proof of Lemma 4.1
Under Assumption A.1, f (x,`) = f (0,0) for all (x,`) = (0,0) and under A.2,





for all n. This means that the sequence {Ln}
∞
n=1 is bounded. That it is
convergent follows from the fact that all convergent subsequences have the same
limit, the unique solution of (11).
Since all players are identical, b Ln =0requires s(L)=0for all L>0 and,
from (4) and (5), this entails






for all L>0. (30)
Observe that the LHS is non-decreasing in L (by Assumption A.1) and the
RHS is strictly decreasing in L (by Assumption A.2). Further, both average and





using (12). If λ ≥ λ,w ed e d u c et h a tLn > 0 for all n and the argument in the
ﬁrst paragraph can be applied. If λ < λ, (31) holds for all large enough n and
we may conclude that Ln =0for such n so Ln −→ e L =0 . Note that in the
knife-edge case, λ = λ,w eh a v eLn > 0 for all n but Ln −→ 0=e L.
7.7 Proof of Lemma 4.3
As the number of players of type t grows without limit, the exogenous weight
of each player of that type falls to zero. It is convenient to deﬁne a ‘limiting’
share function in which this weight is set to zero. We will write e s(t) for this
24function and note that, for any L>0,i ts a t i s ﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions for
players of type t with zero exogenous weight:
f(t) (λσF (L),σL) >
½





with equality if σ > 0,w h e r eσ = e s(t) (L). Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 still apply to the
left hand and right hand sides of (32), respectively. This allows us to conclude
that e s(t) (i) is the unique σ satisfying (32) with equality if σ is positive, (ii) has
the properties of a share function set out in Section 2 and, (iii) has dropout
value e Lt. Assertion (iii) follows by noting that the dropout value of L satisﬁes
(32) with equality if σ > 0 and noting that this gives the deﬁnition of e Lt.T h e
next lemma shows that e st is the pointwise limit of type-t share functions.
Lemma 7.3 Let sn
(t) denote the share function of players of type t with exoge-
nous weight µt/nt (n).I f L<e Lt,t h e nsn
(t) (L) −→ e st (L) as n −→ ∞.


























Conditions (4) and (5) mean that ∇
n ≥ 0 and sn
(t) (L)∇
n =0 .N o t e t h a t , i f






has limit σ,t h el i m i to f∇
n on this
subsequence is the diﬀerence between the left hand and right hand sides of (32).
Since this limit is non-negative and equal to zero when σ > 0, we may deduce






is bounded (between 0 and
1), the conclusion of the lemma follows.
Completion of Proof of Lemma 4.3. Deﬁne L∗ =
³
e Lt0 + e Lt
´
/2.N o t e
that e st (L∗) > 0 which means that there is a positive integer n1 such that
nt (n)e st (L∗) = 2 for n>n1. The preceding lemma implies that there is a
positive integer n2 such that sn
(t) (L∗) > e st (L∗)/2 for all n>n2.F u r t h e r -
more, convergence of type-t0 dropout values to e Lt0 (Lemma 4.2) implies that
there is a positive integer n3 such that Ln
t0 <L ∗ for all n>n3. Hence, if
n>max{n1,n2,n3},w em a yc o n c l u d et h a tnt (n)sn
(t) (Ln
t0) > 1,s i n c esn
(t) is de-
creasing (Proposition 2.2). Hence, the equilibrium value of L in Gn exceeds Ln
t0,
t h ed r o p o u tv a l u eo fp l a y e r so ft y p et0, no player of that type supplies positive
input in Gn.
7.8 Proof of Lemma 4.4

















































25with equality if sn






=0for t ∈ T .I f , f o r s u c h n, we multiply (33) by nt,









and divide by nT (n)=
P




























































which converges to L∗, yields
f(T) (0,0) = λ
F (L∗)
L∗ ,
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tf(t) (0,0) = f(T) (0,0) for t ∈ T . It follows
that L∗ = e LT. A similar argument to the symmetric case can be used to





is bounded and we can conclude that
b Ln −→ e LT as n −→ ∞.
7.9 Proof of Lemma 4.5
The ﬁrst-order conditions (33) for sn






































































is bounded between 0 and 1 by the equilibrium condition

























26is also bounded. This can be justiﬁed by contradiction. If it were false, we
could ﬁnd a subsequence with inﬁnite limit and then choose a type t ∈ T and a





were also convergent and positive for
all n. On this subsequence, (35) holds with equality and taking limits would
lead to a contradiction: a ﬁnite value on the left hand side and an inﬁnite one
on the right hand side. (Recall our assumption that u(t) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable.)
We complete the proof by showing that on every subsequence on which (36)






converges for each t (to e σt,s a y )t h e s e
limiting values are uniquely determined. To justify this claim, we ﬁrst observe
that s(t) (Ln) must be positive for all but a ﬁnite set of n. Taking limits on the
subsequence in (35), we ﬁnd that, for all t ∈ T ,



















f(t)1 (0,0) + λ











and f(t)1 and f(t)2 denote the derivatives of the MRS with respect to its ﬁrst




e σ(t) =1 . (38)
Under A.1, the MRS is non-decreasing in each argument, so both partial deriva-
tives of f(t) are non-negative. Since the average product exceeds the marginal
product, we conclude that βt > 0 for all t ∈ T . Using the ????? theorem of
???????? [ref ?????], we may deduce that there is a unique g AP, {e σt}t∈T which
solves (37) and (38).















xt =1 , xt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T .
The objective function is a sum of strictly convex functions and therefore, itself,
strictly convex. The feasible set is compact and convex. Such an optimization
problem has a unique optimal solution.]
277.10 Completion of proof of Proposition 4.1
We can use Lemma 4.5 to deduce the following expression for the aggregate


















































where we have used (15) and (17) to obtain the ﬁnal line, noting that f(t) (0,0) =
f(T) (0,0) for t ∈ T .
Other types supply no input once n is large enough (Lemma 4.3), so their











which yields the formula (18) immediately.
7.11 Proof of Theorem 5.1
W ec a ne s t a b l i s he ﬃciency by showing that the allocation
n




mizes a positive weighted combination of the ψt (Xt,L t).W r i t i n g {αt}
T
t=1 for
the weights, note that, if we set αt =
£
∂u(t) (0,0)/∂x








We have written L =
PT
t=1 Lt and used the feasibility requirement
PT
t=1 Xt =
F (L).S i n c e Ψ is a concave function of (L1,...,L T),t h eﬁrst order conditions
are necessary and suﬃcient for a maximum. For each t,t h e s ea r e
∂Ψ
∂Lt
= F0 (L) − f(t) (0,0) ≤ 0,
with equality if Lt > 0.




are eﬃcient we use
the fact that
PT














= f(T) (0,0) = f(t) (0,0) for t ∈ T .
The optimality conditions are satisﬁed since b Lt > 0 if and only if t ∈ T ,b y
Lemma 4.3.
287.12 Proof of Theorem 5.2
T h ep r o o fi si nt h r e es t e p s . F i r s t l y ,w es h o wt h a tt y p e si nT supply no input
in an eﬃcient type-symmetric allocation which respects voluntary participation.
Secondly, we show that the aggregate input in such an allocation is e LT. Finally,
for any allocation with these properties, we display a set of type-weights for
which the equilibrium allocation is limiting eﬃcient.
(i) Suppose we had Le
t0 > 0 for some t0 ∈ T . Voluntary participation requires













T + εf(t0) (0,0).































t 6= e LT.
We will show that this contradicts the presumed eﬃciency of {Xe
t,L e
t} by con-
structing a dominating allocation which is identical to the original allocation
for types in T .
We ﬁrst note that Le
t =0if t ∈ T by (i), so Le =
P
t∈T Le





t − Lef(T) (0,0).
Note that voluntary participation dictates a non-negative payoﬀ;i np a r t i c u l a r
Xe
t − Le









/Y e if Y e > 0,
1/#T if Y e =0 ,
where #T denotes the cardinality of T . In either case, we have
β
e
tY e = Xe
t − Le
tf(T) (0,0) for all t ∈ T .

























29Note that the strictly concave function F (L)−Lf(T) (0,0) is uniquely maximized





− e LTf(T) (0,0) >F(Le) − Lef(T) (0,0), (40)
for L 6= e LT. It follows that, if t ∈ T ,
X00
t − L00



































tY e = Xe
t − Le
tf(T) (0,0) ≥ 0,




t = F (Le).T h e ﬁnal inequality is a consequence of voluntary
participation and implies that Xt ≥ 0, so the constructed allocation is feasible.
It also dominates the original allocation since ψt (X00
t ,L 00
t ) > ψt (Xe
t,L e
t) for t ∈




t) for t ∈ T ; this is the promised contradiction.



















− e LTf(T) (0,0)
for t =1 ,...,T.
It follows from voluntary participation, feasibility and the result in (ii) that all
µt ≥ 0 and
PT
t=1 µt =1 . The equivalence (19) follows from Proposition 4.1.
7.13 Proof of Proposition 5.3





























using f(t) (0,0) ≥ f(T) (0,0) for all t and µt0 = νt0 (proportional type weights).
Furthermore, the inequality is actually an equality if t ∈ T (which implies
f(t) (0,0) = f(T) (0,0))o rt0 ∈ T (which implies e σt0 =0 ). The inequalities (20)
follow immediately.
307.14 Proof of Proposition 5.4






































using Lemma 4.6 to justify the third line and Proposition 4.1 for ﬁnal line.
With proportional type weights (µt = νt), the right hand side of (41) is equal to
ψt
³




b Xt, b Lt
oT
t=1
is the limiting equilibrium type allocation. This
proves the required result.
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